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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the policy debate in international finance lies the question of whether monetary authorities should react to both fluctuations in international relative prices and domestic output and inflation. Several papers have explored how monetary policy should react to disturbances in open economies with complete asset markets. These papers have emphasized that monetary policy is influenced by the presence of a terms of trade externality.
Evidence from the literature suggests that strict domestic inflation targeting would be the optimal monetary policy in producer currency pricing circumstances, except where the trade elasticity of substitution (i.e., the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods) is implausibly high. In particular, Gali and Monacelli (2005) showed that the optimal monetary policy in a small open economy is isomorphic to the one in the closed economy, when both the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution one in the producer currency pricing model. 1 The recent financial turmoil has generated greater interest in feasible monetary policy prescriptions not only for economies with sophisticated financial structures, but also for economies with fragile financial structures. Although many emerging economies have shifted from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate regime, the extent to which monetary policy should adjust to account for the impact of the exchange rate on the domestic economy remains highly controversial. Some policymakers in emerging economies still believe in a trade-off between inflation and exchange rate stability, thus bringing into question the desirable form of monetary policy. They believe that monetary policy which preserves the competitiveness of domestic products in the exchange market is necessary to improve the welfare of economies with fragile financial structures.
More recently, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) and De Paoli (2009b) have argued that the configuration of the domestic asset market significantly affects the performance of monetary policy rules, by changing the degree of risk-sharing. In a complete asset market, optimal risk-sharing severs the link between domestic consumption and domestic output, allowing domestic agents to reduce their labor supply without causing a corresponding fall in their consumption levels. In an incomplete asset market, on the other hand, where domestic consumption and domestic output are closely related, domestic households cannot decrease their disutility of labor supply without decreasing their utility from consumption. Therefore, the monetary policy prescription for open economies with complete markets may not hold for open economies with incomplete asset markets.
According to De Paoli (2009b) , the domestic price index inflation targeting (hereafter DPI) rule outperforms the exchange rate pegging (hereafter PEG) rule and the consumer price index inflation targeting (hereafter CPI) rule in financial autarkies as well as incomplete markets, except when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is low. 2 More recent papers have shown that incorporating real rigidities-such as internal or external habit formation-improves the explanatory power of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (hereafter DSGE) models over business cycles. For example, Adolfson et al. (2007) and Christiano, Trabant, and Walentin (2007) have reported that incorporating habit Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) have also argued that near divine coincidence holds for economies characterized by a high trade elasticity of substitution, i.e., where domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes. This is true even in incomplete markets where inefficiencies are present due to exchange rate misalignments. In particular, they showed that an inward-looking monetary policy is optimal for unitary intratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution, if there are only efficient technology shocks.
1 See De Paoli (2009) and Faia and Monacelli (2008) for a small open economy model. 2 The DPI rule outperforms the PEG rule and the CPI rule in an incomplete market as well as in a financial autarky when the domestic and foreign goods are not close substitutes---i.e. when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is higher than 0.7.
formation improves the empirical performance of small-scale, open macroeconomic models by introducing persistence into structural equations (such as the Euler equation and the Phillips curve in the open economy new Keynesian model). Sticky price models with habit persistence in consumption generate the expected hump-shaped response of consumption and output to a monetary shock; the monetary policy implications of such models therefore warrant a closer look. This paper sets up a small open economy with internal and external habit persistence and alternative asset market structures, to explore the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules. Households with external habit unconsciously overheat the economy during expansionary phases, and disproportionately cool down the economy during contractionary phases. Households with external habit tend to work harder than necessary to keep up with the Joneses, causing the economy to produce more than the efficient level of output. In a small open economy, this leads to a deterioration in its terms of trade, while the terms of trade for the rest of the world remains unchanged. In this way, external habit generates the welfare-relevant real exchange rate gap and output gap.
The deterioration in the terms of trade hurts the purchasing power of domestic households and intensifies the negative impact of externality on consumption in a small open economy. Since both consumption and leisure critically depend on the asset market structure that provides options for risk-sharing, the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy prescriptions can differ depending on the prevailing asset market structure.
The objective of the paper is to explore the implications of alternative monetary policy rules under different asset market structures, when households have external or internal habit formation in consumption. Specifically, does habit formation matter for the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in small open economies with alternative asset market structures? This paper will address this issue by utilizing an explicit utility-based welfare analysis.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows:
First, asset market structure is relevant for the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in a small open economy with habit persistence. In particular, inward-looking monetary policy is not invariant in a small open economy with external habit under alternative asset market structures, even if both the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution equal one. Contrary to De Paoli (2009a , 2009b , and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) , the DPI rule is better than the CPI rule in a complete market, but the CPI rule can be better than the DPI rule in a financial autarky with external habit, even if both intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution equal one.
Second, the existence of external habit can reverse the welfare ranking of simple monetary policy rules in a complete market as well as in a financial autarky, for moderate values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution: with external habit, the PEG rule regime outperforms the DPI rule regime for high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods when households are catching up with the Joneses, irrespective of asset market structure. For example, the DPI rule can be inferior to the CPI rule in a small open economy sticky price model with high degree of external habit and financial autarky, while the DPI rule is best among the considered simple rules in a complete asset market. This finding starkly contrasts to the findings of De Paoli (2009b).
Third, the existence of habit matters for the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules, irrespective of internal and external habit. For example, the PEG rule is the best among the considered simple rules if there exits inefficiency in the exchange rate due to incomplete exchange rate pass-through, irrespective of internal and external habit. Finally, we show that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply as well as the intratemporal elasticity between home goods and imported goods plays a pivotal role in determining the welfare ranking of simple monetary rules in a small open economy with nominal rigidities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a canonical small open economy model with habit persistence and nominal price rigidities. Section 3 discusses equilibrium conditions and the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules. Section 4 concludes the paper.
THE MODEL
This section sets up a variant of the new Keynesian model with habit formation applied to a small, open-economy. The world is composed of two countries, home (H) and foreign (F) with population size n and 1-n, respectively. In this paper, the small open economy is characterized as a limiting-case approach, as in Faia and Monacelli (2008) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) . It is assumed that the relative size of the domestic economy is negligible relative to the rest of the world, i.e. Abel (1990 Abel ( , 1999 and Smets and Wouters (2007) Abel (1990 Abel ( , 1999 and Smets and Wouters (2007) . That is, where is aggregate past consumption. In this specification of habit formation, habit depends on one lag of consumption. In the case of internal habit persistence, it is assumed that
Households
The optimal allocation of any given domestic expenditure within each category of goods is given by Similarly, the optimal allocation of any given foreign expenditure within each category of goods is given by where , * t P , * Ft P and * Ht P denote the foreign consumer price index and the price of foreign goods and domestic goods in foreign currency unit in period t, respectively.
Asset Markets
Having looked at habit persistence in households, we now consider three alternative asset markets: the complete market, the incomplete market, and financial autarky.
Complete Markets
As in Gali and Monacelli (2005) , there exists a complete market for state-contingent claims in domestic currency units that are traded internationally. Hence, households can optimally share risk with the rest of the world because they have access to a full set of assets, contingent on all possible states of nature. This asset market structure implies .
Here, is the real exchange rate, and
Here, κ is a parameter capturing the initial cross-country distribution of wealth.
) ( * t C C U is similarly defined. Following Gali and Monacelli (2005) , we assume symmetric initial conditions without loss of generality, in which we have
Incomplete Markets
In an incomplete market, it is assumed that domestic households can trade only one-period nominal riskless bonds, denominated in both home and foreign currencies; meanwhile, foreign households can trade only one-period nominal riskless bonds denominated in foreign currency. It is also assumed that the international trade of foreign currency-denominated bonds is subject to intermediation costs, as in Benigno (2008 Because foreign households are assumed to trade only in foreign currency bonds, their budget constraint can be written as where t Γ is the intermediation profits from loans to the small country.
First order conditions for the household can be summarized as follows:
where foreign values of the corresponding domestic variables are denoted by an asterisk (*).
Similarly, the foreign household's intertemporal decision of bond holdings is given by (15) and (16) imply that the equilibrium real exchange rate is determined by where The log-linearization of (17) shows that the expected depreciation of the real exchange rate is determined by the net foreign asset as well as by the difference of the expected future, current, and past domestic and foreign consumption:
and C is the steady-state consumption, and B η is the sensitivity of intermediation cost or risk premium to the net foreign asset.
Financial Autarky
In a financial autarky, households do not have access to international borrowing or lending. Hence, there is no risk-sharing across borders. Assuming that the initial distribution of wealth across domestic households is symmetrical, the domestic and foreign households' budget constraints can be written as Meanwhile, the value of domestic production equals the value of consumption, and the value of exports equals the value of imports:
where t G is domestic government spending in period t.
Domestic Firms
Differentiated goods and monopolistic competition are introduced along the lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Suppose there is a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods, and each firm indexed by
produces its product with constant returns to scale and a concave production technology. Each domestic firm i takes Ht P and the aggregate demand as given, and chooses its own product price ) (i P Ht . In this economy, the distortion occurs due to the existence of monopolistic competition in the goods market. On average, the firm sets its price above marginal cost. In equilibrium, this makes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor different from their corresponding marginal rate of transformation. Because we do not assign any explicit value to the holding of money balances, we can eliminate the distortion associated with the Friedman rule.
Each monopolistic firm i produces a homogenous good according to where t A is the home country resident's technology process at period t.
are the output and total labor input of the i th firm, respectively. We assume that the productivity shock follows an AR(1) process as (29) is a shortrun nonlinear aggregate supply relation between inflation and output, given expectations regarding future inflation, output, and disturbances. The domestic price aggregator implies that the relative price satisfies the relationship:
Importing Firms
In this section, we consider two cases of the price-setting mechanism for goods imported from the rest of the world. The first is the case of a perfect exchange rate pass-through, wherein foreign companies do not have any role in setting prices, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005 ) and De Paoli (2009a , 2009b . The second is the case of an imperfect exchange rate pass-through, wherein foreign companies have market power and affect the consumer price.
Perfect Pass-Through
First, assume that the Law of One Price holds, such that the price of foreign good j in domestic currency,
, equals its price denominated in foreign currency,
multiplied by the nominal exchange rate, t S :
In the rest of the world, a representative household faces a problem identical to the one outlined above. The only difference is that a negligible weight is assigned to consumption goods produced in the small economy
, and
This is the case of perfect pass-through (PPT), in which a change in the exchange rate is perfectly reflected in the domestic price of imported goods. In PPT, the ratio between the price of foreign imports and the nominal exchange rate is one to one.
Imperfect Pass-Through
To take into account possible delays between movements in the exchange rate and adjustments in imported goods prices, suppose that domestic importers set prices in advance by maximizing the present value of profits as in the monopolistically competitive domestic firms. That is, suppose that domestic local retailers import differentiated goods for which the law of one price holds at the dock, but they face a Calvo-type price optimization problem in setting the domestic currency price of the goods as in Monacelli (2005 ∆ H given. Note that the domestic government budget constraint is given by Assuming a symmetric degree of home bias across countries, and the negligible relative size of home country as in Faia and Monacelli (2008) , goods market clearing in both home and foreign countries requires that For analytical simplicity, assume that the government spending and tax rate are always equal to zero, i.e. ,
The competitive equilibrium conditions consist of the efficiency conditions and the budget constraint of households and firms, and the market clearing conditions of each goods market, labor market, money, and bond market. such that (i) the households' decision rules solve their optimization problem given the states and prices; (ii) the demand for labor solves each firm's cost minimization problem and price setting rules solve its present value maximization problem given the states and the prices; and (3) each goods market, labor market, and bond market are cleared at the corresponding prices, given the initial conditions for the state variables 
WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSET MARKET STRUCTURES
In this section, we explore the effect of external habit on welfare under alternative monetary regimes, using a small open economy as benckmark. Specifically, we explore the welfare rankings of alternative monetary policy rules by employing tsecond-order approximation methods along the line of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). Table 1 . In particular, the intratemporal elasticity between home and foreign goods-which plays a key role in the dynamic properties of the selected macroeconomic variables in the model-is set to values in [1, 6] . We set the subjective discount factor to
Parameter Values
, which is consistent with an annual real interest rate of 4 percent, as in Prescott (1986) . Next, we set the elasticity of substitution among varieties ε to 6, implying the average size of markup to be 1.2, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) . The values of the nominal rigidity parameter, iα and * α , are chosen to reflect the fact that on average, firms reoptimize their prices annually in the Calvo-type sticky price model. Faia and Monacelli (2008) , and Gali and Monacelli (2005) .
Finally, the exogenous driving process, i.e. the (log) productivity, ) (t a and , ) ( * t y is assumed to follow an AR(1) as in De Paoli (2009), Faia and Monacelli (2008) , and Gali and Monacelli (2005) .
Real Exchange Rate and Welfare
As described in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) , internal monopolistic distortion and external terms of trade distortion influence welfare in a small open economy where domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes. In a small open economy with external habit, externality in consumption habit also influences welfare, in addition to the terms of trade externality. One can address the full implications of the effect of external distortions on welfare using a second-order Taylor expansion to the utility function of the representative household.
More importantly, the performance of monetary policy rules depends on the presence of external habit and asset market structure. We will discuss how the presence of external habit affects monetary policy prescription in a complete market and a financial autarky, using the first-order terms of the approximated logarithmic utility.
Equilibrium conditions in a complete market imply that the utility function of the household with external habit can be linearly approximated as where and is aggregate consumption at t-1. refer to terms of order higher than one, and . . . p i t refers to terms independent of policy, such as foreign consumption and exogenous shocks. Note that has a negative value and decreases as either the degree of external habit or the degree of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods increases ( Figures 1A, 1B Meanwhile, the equilibrium conditions in a financial autarky imply that the utility function of the household can be approximated as where
In (50), the sign of the term is ambiguous. depends not only on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods η , but also on the degree of external habit b and the degree of openness θ .
As either the degree of external habit or the degree of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods increases, decreases ( Figures 2C and 2D ). takes a positive value when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is high and the degree of external habit is low ( Figure 1C ). That is, on average, an appreciated real exchange rate is welfare improving under financial autarky with a higher degree of external habit, while the reverse is true in a financial autarky with a lower degree of external habit.
In the case of internal habit, the first-order approximation of the utility function can be written as 
Price Stability vs. Exchange Rate Stability in the Case of Perfect Exchange Rate Pass-Through
In this section, we discuss the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules in the case of perfect exchange rate pass-through, by exploiting the recursive nature of the lifetime utility function (1) to compute the welfare cost, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). 
Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Financial Autarkies
In the case of a financial autarky, consumption is fully linked to domestic output. Moreover, households work more than necessary in the presence of external habit, producing output that exceeds the efficient level. Hence, monetary policy that lowers production to a more efficient level improves welfare by decreasing the disutility of (excessive) labor hours. An additional improvement in welfare is possible if the policy leads to a real exchange rate appreciation, leading households with higher purchasing power to divert some of their consumption from domestic goods to foreign goods.
Since lowering the volatility of the real exchange rate is associated with a real exchange rate appreciation, monetary policy aimed at stabilizing either the general price index or the (2006) show that the conditional welfare cost measure is given by . exchange rate will tend to cause a bigger appreciation in the real exchange rate, much than more than stabilizing the domestic price index would (As shown in equation (50), either the CPI rule or the PEG rule is more likely to outperform the DPI rule under a financial autarky, if there exists a substantial degree of external habit. The presence of external habit plays an important role in ranking alternative monetary policy rules even if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is low, i.e. even if home and foreign goods are complementary. Consider the benchmark case, where both the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities are equal to one, i.e.
In the absence of external habit, there is no expenditure switching effect under the benchmark case, because the income and substitution effects due to international relative price movements cancel each other out. In contrast, international relative price movements will have an expenditure switching effect even if , i.e., if households have a high degree of external habit. The following tables report differences in welfare measured as a % of the permanent shift in steady-state consumption, between a policy that targets domestic inflation (PPI rule) and one that pegs the exchange rate (PEG rule). They also show the difference between the PPI rule and the CPI rule (which targets consumer price index inflation). Tables 3-5 show that the CPI rule is better than the DPI rule in a small economy with financial autarky for the degree of external habit equal to 0.7, when intratemporal elasticity of substitution is higher than 2. The PEG rule is better than the DPI rule for higher values of Frisch labor supply elasticity and intratemporal elasticity of substitution. This implies that the CPI and PEG rules are more successful in reducing the disutility of excess labor hours than the DPI rule, as long as there is room for households to substitute their labor hours and consumption, i.e., (2009b) who showed that the DPI rule is best in both a financial autarky and a complete market.
Tables 3 to 5 also show that in addition to the degree of habit persistence, both the Frisch labor supply elasticity of substitution and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and foreign goods affect the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules. We now consider the case of internal habit, where a household's current consumption is a determinant of future utility. With internal habit, there is no inefficiency or externality in production or labor hours; the findings of De Paoli (2009b) therefore hold in this case, i.e., the DPI rule is better than the PEG at high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution (See Tables 3-5 ).
Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules in Complete Markets
Domestic consumption is not closely linked to domestic production in a complete market. First, consider the case of external habit. In a complete market, the coefficient of the expected real exchange rate in the welfare equation (39) dominates the wealth effect for a higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution, thereby making the PEG rule better than the DPI rule. If the Frisch labor supply elasticity is high (i.e., if households are more willing to intratemporally substitute their labor supply when wage changes due to an external shock), then the policy of maintaining a stable exchange rate is welfare improving. The effect of a real exchange rate appreciation on welfare increases if there is more room for households to decrease their labor supply and households have a higher degree of external habit in consumption, as shown in Tables 6-8. If households have a substantial degree of external habit, a higher Frisch labor supply elasticity could overturn the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules, even if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is low. For example, the welfare gain from the PEG rule relative to the DPI rule is approximately 0.007% of the steady state consumption for 
= η
That is, as long as domestic and foreign consumption goods are not close complements, any monetary policy that diverts some domestic production toward the foreign country can be welfare improving in the economy with external habit . Maintaining the nominal exchange rate reduces the volatility of the real exchange rate by causing the real exchange rate to appreciate, thereby reducing the disutility of domestic production and increasing the consumption of foreign goods.
However, the Frisch labor supply elasticity plays a relatively minor role in the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in the internal habit case. The effect of the real exchange rate appreciation on welfare depends on the degree of intratemporal elasticity of substitution more than the Frisch labor supply elasticity when households fully take into account their current consumption decision on future utility.
Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Incomplete Markets
We now consider the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in incomplete markets. In an incomplete market, the wealth effects are more tightly linked to domestic production than in a complete market. In this case, the effect of habit on the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules is relatively limited irrespective of external or internal habit (Tables 9-11 
Price Stability versus Exchange Rate Stability in Imperfect Pass-Through
The previous section demonstrated that, in the case of perfect exchange rate pass-through, the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules depends on the degree of habit persistence and the Frisch labor supply elasticity, as well as asset market structure . The PEG rule outperforms the PPI rule in a small open economy with external habit and high intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, irrespective of asset market structure. In this subsection, we examine the relative performance of simple monetary policy rules in the case of imperfect exchange rate pass-through.
Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in a Financial Autarky
In a financial autarky, where the wealth effects are completely linked to domestic production, the effect of an imperfect exchange rate pass-through (or the effect of the exchange rate misalignment) on welfare is marginal, as shown in Tables 12-14. The CPI rule performs best for a substantial degree of external habit, while the DPI rule performs better than the CPI rule and PEG rule for a moderate degree of external habit, irrespective of the values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution for traded goods and habit.
We now consider the the case of internal habit. In this case, the inefficiency in the exchange rate arising from exchange rate misalignment is not enough to reverse the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules. The findings of De Paoli (2009a) that the DPI rule is better than the PEG at high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution also hold in this instance. 
Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Complete Markets
Exchange rate misalignment plays a pivotal role in a small open economy with a complete market, irrespective of habit formation. Moreover, an imperfect exchange rate pass-through dominates all the other elements we have previously considered (i.e., habit persistence, intratemporal elasticity of substitution, and the Frisch labor supply elasticity), making the PEG rule the best among the considered simple rules. This reflects the fact that the real exchange rate gap arising from the exchange rate misalignment affects welfare more critically than the output gap arising from the habit. Figures 1 and 2 show that the coefficient of the real exchange rate in the welfare equation is always negative, irrespective of the degree of habit and intratemporal elasticity of substitution. In this circumstance, monetary policy which causes the the real exchange rate to appreciate is more likely to be welfare-improving. With imperfect exchange rate pass-through, both domestically producing and importing firms reoptimize their prices infrequently. Hence, the composite general price also moves sluggishly, making the real exchange rate highly dependent on the nominal exchange rate. As such, the PEG rule causes the real exchange rate to appreciate more than any other simple monetary policy rule (Tables 15-17 ). 
Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Incomplete Markets
Finally, we consider the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in incomplete markets. In an incomplete market with imperfect exchange rate pass-through, the effect of habit on the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules is as limited as in a financial autarky, irrespective of external or internal habit.
We first consider the case of external habit. If the degree of external habit is high, then the impact of external habit on welfare is the same in incomplete markets as in financial autarkies. For example, consider the case of The welfare gain from the PEG rule and the CPI rule relative to the DPI rule are approximately 0.0003% and 0.0002% of the steady state consumption, respectively. This shows that the impact of external habit and the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules is similar to that in a financial autarky.
In the case of internal habit, the welfare ranking of alternative simple monetary policy rules does not change at all in an incomplete market. The inefficiency in the exchange rate gap arising from exchange rate misalignment is not enough to reverse the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules, as shown in Tables 18-20. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the welfare implications of simple monetary policy rules such as the DPI rule, the CPI rule, and the PEG rule by introducing external and internal habit formation into a small open economy with nominal price rigidities under alternative asset market structures. We have shown that asset market structure is relevant for the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules, even if both the intratemporal trade elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption are unitary.
The DPI rule can be inferior to the CPI rule in a sticky price model with a high degree of external habit in financial autarky, while the DPI rule is best among the considered simple rules in a complete asset market. This finding contrasts sharply to those of De Paoli (2009) and Faia and Monacelli (2008) . More importantly, we have shown that the existence of external habit can reverse the welfare ranking of simple monetary policy rules in a complete market as well as in a financial autarky, for moderate values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution; with external habit, the PEG rule regime outperforms the DPI rule regime for high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported products when households are catching up with the Joneses, irrespective of asset market structure.
Finally, we have shown that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply as well as the intratemporal elasticity between home goods and imported goods plays a pivotal role in determining the welfare ranking of simple monetary rules in a small open economy with nominal rigidities.
